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ARTISTIC PROOFS: A KANTIAN APPROACH TO AESTHETICS 
IN MATHEMATICS
WEIJIA WANG
This paper explores the nature of mathematical beauty from a Kantian perspective.
According to Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, satisfaction in beauty is subjective
and non-conceptual, yet a proof can be beautiful even though it relies on concepts.
I propose that, much like art creation, the formulation and study of a complex
demonstration involves multiple and progressive interactions between the freely original
imagination and taste (that is, the aesthetic power of judgement). Such a proof is artistic
insofar as it is guided by beauty, namely, the mere feeling about the imagination’s free
lawfulness. The beauty in a proof’s process and the perfection in its completion together
facilitate a transition from subjective to objective purposiveness, a transition that Kant
himself does not address in the third Critique.
Many would call mathematical principles, such as the Law of Sines, elegant or
beautiful. Mathematicians, in particular, underscore the aesthetic value of their
works. For instance, Bertrand Russell asserts that ‘mathematics, rightly viewed,
possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty’.1 And, according to G. H. Hardy,
‘beauty is the first test: there is no permanent place in the world for ugly
mathematics.’2 However, some philosophers remain sceptical about so-called
mathematical beauty. Nick Zangwill suggests we distinguish ‘intellectual
pleasures’ in proofs and theories from ‘aesthetic pleasures’.3 Cain Todd also
claims that the alleged ‘aesthetic’ judgements in mathematics are ‘too closely
correlated’ with logical and epistemic considerations to warrant unequivocally
being called aesthetic.4
In his Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant characterizes judgements of
taste as ‘aesthetic’ and only determinable by the feeling of pleasure and
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displeasure.5 In judging a beautiful form, we find in our cognitive faculties
a ‘lawfulness without law’, insofar as their operation is harmonious and yet
free from conceptual determination (CJ, AA 5:240). On this basis, Kant rejects
the notion of ‘intellectual beauty’ and regards a shape or a number’s property
of usefulness as a ‘relative perfection’ (CJ, AA 5:366).6 By distinguishing beauty
from perfection, Kant aims to free aesthetic experience from the demands of
morality and objective cognition. 
Nevertheless, in § 62 of the third Critique, Kant also states that ‘it would be
better to be able to call a demonstration of such properties beautiful’, even
though the basis of the satisfaction ‘lies in concepts’ (CJ, AA 5:366),7 which
seems to contradict his own precept of ‘aesthetic’ judgements. Kant himself
does not elaborate on this point, for the main concern of § 62 is a kind of
formal, objective purposiveness in mathematics. And so, this paper does not
aim to interpret Kant’s particular statement of beautiful demonstrations but
rather approaches the problem of mathematical beauty from a Kantian
perspective. In turn, the discussion will also shed light on Kant’s theory of taste
and artistic creation. Admittedly, given Kant’s explicit dismissal of ‘intellectual
beauty’, this approach focuses on rudimentary mathematics, especially
Euclidian geometry, as reflected in Kant’s examples and which is familiar to
common people, but the implications thereof may be applicable to issues in
contemporary higher mathematics. 
I propose that, much like the creation of a beautiful artwork, the formulation
of a complex demonstration involves multiple and progressive interactions
between the freely original imagination and taste. Without knowing the whole
series of subsidiary steps, we start a mathematical proof by trying a certain
initial step on account of its compatibility with some as-yet indeterminate
concept. In presenting this step, the imagination plays harmoniously with
the understanding without any conceptual accordance. This free lawfulness of
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5 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric
Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), AA 5:203. Hereafter: CJ.
6 Kant sometimes distinguishes between the ‘utility’ and the ‘perfection’ of an object,
that is, between its ‘external’ and ‘internal’ objective purposiveness (CJ, AA 5:226).
However, this paper will follow his terminology in CJ, AA 5:366, and employ
‘usefulness’ and ‘perfection’ interchangeably.
7 Wenzel argues that ‘Kant’s theory of “free play” and “purposiveness” is useful in seeing
and explaining (contrary to Kant’s own claims) how taste matters in mathematical
discoveries’. Christian Helmut Wenzel, ‘Mathematics and Aesthetics in Kantian
Perspective’, in I, Mathematician, vol. 2, Further Introspections on the Mathematical Life,
ed. Peter Casazza, Steven G. Krantz, and Randi D. Ruden (Bedford, MA: Consortium of
Mathematics, 2016), 103. However, is Wenzel’s thought indeed contrary to all of
Kant’s claims? There is a tension between Kant’s general theory of taste and his
argument in CJ, AA 5:366, which Wenzel does not seem to take into account. 
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the imagination grounds the purely aesthetic satisfaction in a judgement of
taste. Such a proof is ‘artistic’, even though it eventually justifies a mathematical
principle and rests on conceptual accordance. The beauty in a proof’s process
and the perfection in its completion together facilitate a transition from
subjective purposiveness to objective purposiveness in the third Critique,
a transition that Kant himself fails to address.
This paper comprises four sections. Section I presents an analysis of Kant’s
distinction between beauty and perfection. With reference to Kant’s theory of
artistic creation, Section II investigates the interaction between the freely
original imagination and the power of judgement in doing mathematics.
Further, Section III proposes their progressive interactions, whereby the aesthetic
power of judgement (that is, taste) brings free lawfulness to the imagination.
I
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant distinguishes between two types
of satisfaction as follows.8
The first, satisfaction in perfection, lies in an object’s accordance with 
the concept of what it ought to be (CJ, AA 5:226–27). As Kant writes in 
the second Introduction to the Critique, we have this cognitive aim to obtain
a coherent order of nature in its particular laws, such that we feel ‘noticeable
pleasure, often indeed admiration’ in comprehending ‘empirical heterogeneous
laws of nature under a principle’ (CJ, AA 5:187). Interestingly, in § 62 of 
the Critique, where Kant discusses mathematical theorems and properties of
shapes and numbers, he uses exactly the same expression and asserts an
‘admiration’ for the ‘unification of heterogeneous rules […] in one principle’ 
(CJ, AA 5:365).
In Kant’s example, we can construct a triangle with a given baseline and
a given angle opposite to it in infinitely many ways, yet ‘the circle comprehends
them all, as the geometrical locus for all triangles that satisfy this condition’
(CJ, AA 5: 362).9 Kant seems to refer to a consequence of the Law of Sines.
Figure 1 below shows that the circle O, which comprehends the given baseline
AB and the given angle ∠C, also comprehends all triangles with the same
8 Discussions of this distinction are scattered in many places in the third Critique, for
example, §§ 3, 15, 34, 62. Kant actually proposes a trichotomy of satisfaction, the
third type being the satisfaction in the agreeable (for example, the pleasure we take
in fresh air), an investigation of which surpasses the scope of this paper.
9 Kant suggests several examples of geometrical theorems. For an extensive
discussion, see Courtney David Fugate, ‘“With a Philosophical Eye”: The Role of
Mathematical Beauty in Kant’s Intellectual Development’, in Kant: Studies on
Mathematics in the Critical Philosophy, ed. Emily Carson and Lisa Shabel (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2016), 241–49.
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baseline and opposite angles, such as ΔABD and ΔABE, whereas ∠C, ∠D, and
∠E must be equivalent in degree. Figure 2 shows one of the many ways to
prove this: we can draw subsidiary lines OA, OB, and OC, construct three
isosceles triangles and thereby demonstrate that the degree of ∠C is a constant
wherever point C falls on the circle.
Fig. 1 Fig. 2
The unification of the heterogeneous shapes (that is, the various angles) in
one principle (that is, the concept of the circle) accords with our cognitive
pursuit of systematicity and thus brings about noticeable pleasure or even
admiration in the perfection of these shapes. 
The second type of satisfaction Kant discusses is satisfaction in beauty.
A judgement of taste is ‘aesthetic’ or ‘subjective’, which means its sole
determining ground is ‘the feeling of pleasure and displeasure’ (CJ, AA 20:224).
While a judgement (Urteil) of taste is a verdict about the relation between
a form and my feeling, our mental faculty for perceiving this feeling is taste,
which is a use of the aesthetic power of judgement (Urteilskraft).10 The use of
taste, then, is the mental operation of judging (Beurteilung) something by mere
pleasure or displeasure.11
For Kant, the power of judgement in general is ‘the faculty of subsuming
under rules’.12 Since there cannot be another objective rule for determining
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10 the other use of the aesthetic power of judgement is the judging of sublimity 
(CJ, AA 5:244–78), which is irrelevant to our concern here. In the remaining text I shall
identify the aesthetic power of judgement with taste.
11 As Vandenabeele points out, we should distinguish between ‘the act of judging or
contemplating the object [Beurtheilung des Gegenstandes]’ and ‘the judgment of taste
[Geschmacksurtheil] as such’. Bart Vandenabeele, ‘Beauty, Disinterested Pleasure, and
Universal Communicability: Kant’s Response to Burke’, Kant-Studien 103 (2012): 225.
12 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), AA A132/B171.
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whether something stands under a rule, Kant calls the power of judgement
a ‘special talent’ which cannot be taught, and which decides whether
a manifold of particular elements or objects stand under a concept.13 Even
a determination of perfection requires the power of judgement, where this
faculty judges a manifold’s accordance with a determinate concept through
satisfaction in perfection.
On this basis, Kant proposes that, in judging the beautiful, the aesthetic
power of judgement (that is, taste) judges a manifold’s accordance with some
‘indeterminate concept’ (CJ, AA 5:341). For Kant, the imagination is the faculty
for the ‘composition of the manifold of intuition’, while the understanding is
the faculty for the ‘unity of the concept that unifies the representations’ 
(CJ, AA 5:217). In cognition, the imagination represents to our mind a manifold
of items such as lindens and willows, while the understanding is to
comprehend them under the concept ‘tree’ and to determine the imagination’s
activity accordingly. In judging the beautiful, however, the two cognitive
faculties remain in a subjective ‘free play’ (CJ, AA 5:217).14 A beautiful form can
be described in all sorts of words, but its beauty is ineffable and cannot be
grasped by concepts.
Kant’s distinction between beauty and perfection establishes the freedom of
the aesthetic from the demands of morality and objective cognition. In daily
language we may call a pattern ‘beautiful’ on account of its correspondence to
the golden ratio and the pleasure thereof, but how could we differentiate such
pleasure from what we feel in judging a well-organized shelf or a precisely
sliced cake? From a Kantian perspective, these are all instances of perfection or
‘regularity’ (Regelmäßigkeit), that is, a thing’s conformity with its rule (Regel), or
concept (CJ, AA 5:242). By contrast, the creation and appreciation of beauty
exists on a non-conceptual basis which grounds the mere feeling of pleasure.
This enables us to understand Kant’s dismissal of the notion of ‘intellectual
beauty’: as a consequence of the Law of Sines, the aforementioned useful
property of a circle for constructing certain triangles cannot be called
beautiful, because we judge them intellectually ‘in accordance with concepts’
(CJ, AA 5:366). 
Nevertheless, Kant states that ‘it would be better to be able to call
a demonstration of such properties beautiful’, because ‘the satisfaction,
although its ground lies in concepts, is subjective, whereas perfection is
13 Ibid., AA A133/B172.
14 For a detailed discussion on the free play, see Weijia Wang, ‘Three Necessities in
Kant’s Theory of Taste: Necessary Universality, Necessary Judgment, and Necessary
Free Harmony’, International Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2018): 255–73.
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accompanied with an objective satisfaction’ (CJ, AA 5:366).15 For Kant,
‘demonstration’ can be synonymous with schematic hypotyposis, whereby
the imagination presents a concept by intuition (CJ, AA 5:342, 352), but
a demonstration, thus understood, must be immediately conceptual and 
non-beautiful. It is noteworthy that what Kant characterizes as beautiful in § 62
is specifically a demonstration of ‘such properties’ (CJ, AA 5:366), such as 
the circle’s usefulness for constructing certain triangles, and we demonstrate
this property by proving the Law of Sines. Therefore, we should read Kant’s
statement here in light of his definition of ‘demonstration’ elsewhere as
a ‘mathematical proof’.16 Either way, a demonstration always keeps
a determinate concept in view, which normally entails its objectivity.17 And yet,
Kant calls the satisfaction ‘subjective’, which means it does not derive from any
conceptual unification or provision of understanding.
Kant does not elaborate on how exactly a demonstration can be beautiful.
Nevertheless, as I shall show, it is very rewarding to inquire into the nature of
mathematical beauty, especially that in Euclidian geometry, from a Kantian
perspective. In the next section, I shall argue that the power of judgement
brings lawfulness to the imagination’s free originality in artistic creation.
II
Kant defines ‘genius’ as the ‘talent (natural gift) that gives the rule to art’ 
(CJ, AA 5:306). Art presupposes a rule, which cannot be couched in a formula,
and which must be abstracted from the deed (CJ, AA 5:309). Genius displays
itself not so much in presenting a determinate concept as in expressing an
aesthetic idea, namely, a ‘representation of the imagination that occasions
Artistic Proofs: A Kantian Approach to Aesthetics in Mathematics
15 As Wenzel notices, in his Lectures on Anthropology, the pre-Critique Kant once claims
that ‘mathematical figures are not beautiful, but demonstrations in geometry can
be beautiful due to their shortness, their completeness, their natural light, and
their suitability for an easier understanding’. Immanuel Kant, Vorlesung Collins
(Wintersemester 1772/1773), in Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1997), 
AA 25:183 (translated by Wenzel). This may reflect a kind of ambivalence in Kant’s
thoughts. Christian Helmut Wenzel, ‘Beauty, Genius, and Mathematics: Why Did Kant
Change His Mind?’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 18 (2001): 426; ‘Mathematics and
Aesthetics’, 99.
16 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic, trans. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), AA 9:71, 24:234, 893.
17 In the third Critique, Kant usually identifies ‘objective’ with ‘conceptual’ and associates
both with ‘perfection’ (CJ, AA: 226–29, § 15). One might argue that Kant refers
a beautiful demonstration not to the process of a proof but to its product, such as
a regular figure which demonstrates or presents a geometrical concept; in this case,
we aesthetically play with the figure by bracketing its concept and beholding it in
a subjective way. Interesting as it is, I would not consider this a faithful interpretation
of Kant’s text; for a demonstration, qua schematic hypotyposis or a mathematical
proof, necessarily involves consideration of a concept and cannot abstract from it.
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much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought,
i.e., concept, to be adequate to it’ (CJ, AA 5:314). As components of genius, our
‘imagination’ produces such an aesthetic idea and our ‘spirit’ finds its expression
in an ‘aesthetic attribute’, which ‘gives the imagination cause to spread itself
over a multitude of related representations’ (CJ, AA 5:313–15, comp. 5:320). 
In Kant’s example, an artist’s imagination produces the aesthetic idea of
Jupiter’s heavenly powerfulness, which contains infinite intuitions or ‘much
thinking’. Further, the artist’s spirit conveys this otherwise ineffable aesthetic
idea through an ‘aesthetic attribute’ that is Jupiter’s eagle. The eagle, with the
lightning in its claws, stimulates the judging subject’s imagination to re-create
the aesthetic idea of Jupiter’s powerfulness; and so, the artist communicates his
idea to the audience.
For Kant, genius features ‘originality’ (CJ, AA 5:307), which means the
imagination’s ‘freedom from all guidance by rules’ in producing aesthetic ideas
(CJ, AA 5:317). Meanwhile, Kant characterizes the mental state in artistic
creation as a ‘free correspondence of the imagination to the lawfulness of
the understanding’ (CJ, AA 5:317). The key question is: how should we reconcile
these two types of freedom? I associate them with two correlated, yet clearly
distinct, respects of ‘productive imagination’ that Kant examines in the third
Critique.
The first respect refers to the imagination’s free originality. In Anthropology
from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant defines the ‘productive’ imagination as ‘a
faculty of the original presentation of the object (exhibitio originaria), which
thus precedes experience’.18 Similarly, in the third Critique, Kant describes 
the imagination in artistic creation as ‘a productive cognitive faculty’, which is
‘very powerful in creating, as it were, another nature, out of the material
which the real one gives it’ (CJ, AA 5:314). On both occasions, Kant calls 
the imagination ‘productive’ in view of its originality or creativity.
For Kant, even when the imagination reproduces certain empirical materials,
this faculty may still produce a manifold of intuitions insofar as it arbitrarily
associates the materials in a fashion which is not derivative from, and thus not
preceded by, experience.19 The two functions are often intertwined. For instance,
although a musician requires empirical acoustic elements to compose, it is his
original imagination that, in reproducing these given sensations, associates
them in various original manners.
18 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, in Anthropology, History,
and Education, trans. Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007), AA 7:167.
19 Ibid., AA 7:168.
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We consider the imagination original when it brings to mind some shape
following an a priori principle, for such a presentation does not rely on
experience. On the other hand, we consider the imagination freely original
when it presents an intuition even without following certain a priori principles.
This is consistent with daily language. We would call calligraphy ‘original’ or
‘creative’ only when the writing does not entirely follow pure, geometrical laws
such as symmetry, cursiveness, and so on. Calligraphy does not necessarily
violate or completely abandon such laws, but its originality consists in how it
surpasses their limits.
The second respect of the ‘productive imagination’ refers to the imagination’s
free lawfulness. In the first Critique, Kant calls the imagination ‘productive’
insofar as its synthesis is an ‘exercise of spontaneity’, which determines the form
of sense a priori ‘in accordance with the unity of apperception’ and 
‘in accordance with the categories’.20 For Kant, the ‘unity of apperception’, in
relation to the synthesis of the imagination, is the understanding,21 while 
the ‘categories’ are nothing other than the pure concepts of the understanding.22
In this context, the imagination’s operation is ‘productive’ in terms of its
accordance with the understanding’s pure concepts or laws. By contrast, 
the imagination is ‘reproductive’ when determined by empirical laws.
This sheds light on Kant’s statement in the third Critique that the imagination,
in its ‘free lawfulness’ (freie Gesetzmäßigkeit), is taken ‘not as reproductive, 
as subjected to the laws of association, but as productive and self-active 
(as the authoress of voluntary forms of possible intuitions)’ (CJ, AA 5:240). In line
with the first Critique, Kant hereby describes the imagination as ‘productive’ 
in view of its lawfulness and its freedom from empirical laws. Nevertheless, as
Kant further points out in the same paragraph, in representing a beautiful form,
the imagination enjoys even more freedom, as its lawfulness is now ‘without
law’ and its correspondence to the understanding becomes ‘subjective’ 
or non-conceptual (CJ, AA 5:241). Hence, the imagination accords with 
the understanding’s lawfulness only in general and not with any determinate
laws.23
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20 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, AA B151–52. 
21 Ibid., AA A119.
22 Ibid., AA A79/B105–A80/B105.
23 Following Bernard’s translation of ‘freie Gesetzmäßigkeit’ as ‘free conformity to law’,
Makkreel asserts that the imagination hereby ‘conforms to laws that are still the laws
of the understanding’. Rudolf A. Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant:
The Hermeneutical Import of the ‘Critique of Judgment’ (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1990), 47. Similarly, following Bernard’s translation of ‘gesetzmäßig’ 
(CJ, AA 5:241) as ‘conformed to law’ instead of ‘lawful’, Zammito declares that 
‘the imagination is operating in accordance with law without yet being aware of it 
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This leads to Kant’s assertion that the imagination displays a kind of freedom
when ‘it schematizes without a concept’ (CJ, AA 5:287). For Kant, to schematize
a concept, the imagination generates the ‘representation of a general
procedure’ for providing the concept with an image and thereby prepares
itself for exhibiting the concept in various representations.24 Now that 
the understanding aims at unifying representations through a concept, 
the imagination, to schematize without any (determinate) concept, is disposed
to exhibit some concept in general and to accord with the understanding’s
lawfulness only in general.25
In its free lawfulness, the imagination is possibly ‘bound to a determinate
form’ and ‘to this extent has no free play (as in invention)’ (CJ, AA 5:240). When
we judge a beautiful rose, our imagination must represent the rose’s given
form, such that its operation is only free from conceptual accordance but not
free from experience. This explains why artistic and mathematical creation, qua
original creation, presupposes the imagination’s free originality.
Now we can draw two important differences between the two respects of
the ‘productive imagination’.
Firstly, the imagination’s free, original production is not necessarily lawful.
As Kant puts it, ‘there can also be original nonsense’ (CJ, AA 5:307). It is one
thing that the imagination produces some form, but it is quite another that
the imagination, in presenting this form, conforms to the understanding’s
lawfulness. Moreover, the judging of this conformity (if any) requires the power
of judgement, a faculty that is not involved in the original production itself.
For Kant, while the richness of the imagination produces ‘nothing but
nonsense’ through its ‘lawless freedom’, taste is ‘the discipline (or corrective) of
genius’; and so, to ask whether genius or taste is more essential in creation of
beautiful art is to ask ‘whether imagination or the power of judgment counts for
more’ (CJ, AA 5:319). It remains as controversial whether taste should be internal
and expressly observing it’. John H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s ‘Critique of
Judgment’ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 114. I disagree with both
commentators, for Kant explicitly states that the mental state is ‘a lawfulness without
law’ (CJ, AA 5:241), that is, a lawfulness free from empirical as well as pure laws. In my
view, Bernard’s translations are not erroneous in themselves but do not square with
the context. Comp. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (London:
Macmillan, 1914), 96.
24 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, AA A140/B179–A140/B180.
25 I believe this is the mental disposition which Henrich calls ‘the conditions of
a possible conceptualization in general’. Dieter Henrich, Aesthetic Judgment and the
Moral Image of the World: Studies in Kant (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1992), 49. For a detailed discussion on the imagination’s ‘free lawfulness’, see Hannah
Ginsborg, ‘Lawfulness without a Law: Kant on the Free Play of Imagination and
Understanding’, Philosophical Topics 25 (1997): 37–81.
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or external to genius,26 but we can safely interpret taste as external to the freely
original imagination – their relation will become our primary concern in
Section III.
Secondly, the imagination can be free from certain conceptual guidance in
its original creativity; by contrast, it is free from certain conceptual accordance
in its free lawfulness. When the imagination arbitrarily brings to mind an
aesthetic idea – for instance, countless sorts of forms without aiming at any
geometrical concept – a freely originated form may nevertheless contingently
fall under the concept of ‘circle’, such that the imagination displays lawfulness in
presenting this form; and yet, this lawfulness is not free but is confined by
the geometrical concept. On the other hand, a form may contain ‘precisely such
a composition of the manifold as the imagination would design in harmony
with the lawfulness of the understanding in general if it were left free by itself’
(CJ, AA 5:240–41). In this case, whether the form is original or given, 
the aesthetic power of judgement judges the imagination’s free lawfulness by
a mere feeling of pleasure. To summarize, it is one thing to freely and originally
produce an aesthetic idea and its expression in an aesthetic attribute or a form,
but it is quite another that certain features of this form are not determinable
under any concept; only in view of such features do we judge a form to be
beautiful.27
According to Kant, it is with regard to the imagination that an artwork
deserves to be called ‘inspired’, that is, ‘rich and original in ideas’, but more
importantly, it is with regard to the power of judgement that an artwork
deserves to be called ‘beautiful’, insofar as the imagination in its freedom
Artistic Proofs: A Kantian Approach to Aesthetics in Mathematics
26 Guyer argues that taste is ‘internal’ to genius, but he admits this reading’s difficulty in
answering why Kant contrasts taste to genius as the latter’s discipline or corrective.
Paul Guyer, ‘Genius and Taste: A Response to Joseph Cannon, “The Moral Value of
Artistic Beauty in Kant”’, Kantian Review 16 (2011): 130, 132. Meanwhile, Cannon holds
that genius exhibits aesthetic ideas ‘in exemplary (but not yet beautiful) works of art’,
such that ‘genius involves the power of judgment’ but not ‘a free exercise of judgment’.
Joseph Cannon, ‘Reply to Paul Guyer’, Kantian Review 16 (2011): 136. However, I find
Cannon’s premise implausible, for Kant does ascribe to genius the disposition of ‘free
correspondence of the imagination to the lawfulness of the understanding’, namely,
the disposition in our judging of beauty (CJ, AA 5:317–18). As I see it, Guyer’s and
Cannon’s readings correspond respectively to what Allison calls the ‘thick’ and 
the ‘thin’ conceptions of genius and reflect ambivalence in Kant’s thoughts. See
Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the ‘Critique of Aesthetic Judgment’
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 301.
27 Cassirer ascribes both cases to the so-called ‘aesthetic imagination’, which is from
both empirical and pure laws. As I see it, the notion of ‘aesthetic imagination’, not
incorrect in itself, obscures the crucial difference between the imagination’s two
types of freedom. H. W. Cassirer, A Commentary on Kant’s ‘Critique of Judgment’
(London: Methuen, 1970), 217, 280–81.
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nevertheless conforms to the understanding (CJ, AA 5:319). Indeed, Kant
specifies the work of genius as ‘beautiful art’ (CJ, AA 5:308). An aesthetic
attribute represents an idea beautifully. While the power of judgement in
general imposes lawfulness on the freely original imagination, in the creation of
a ‘beautiful art’, the aesthetic power of judgement disciplines the imagination
without concepts and brings it into free lawfulness.
By analogy, I propose that, in formulation of a mathematical demonstration,
the freely original imagination also interacts with the power of judgement. On
the one hand, the imagination can introduce countless intermediate steps
(that is, an aesthetic idea) without entirely relying on conceptual guidance. On
the other hand, I argue that the power of judgement ‘sifts’ the multitude of
possible steps so as to select the one step that is conducive to the eventual
proof. Mathematicians, much like artists, often arbitrarily consider certain
shapes or numbers and associate them in various ways that are purely
subjective. Hence, the two differ not so much in their imaginations’ free
originality as in its free lawfulness. 
It must be emphasized that an artist aims to express his or her aesthetic
ideas in aesthetic attributes, which convey aesthetic ideas through ‘the free
correspondence of the imagination to the lawfulness of the understanding’,
that is, beautifully. By contrast, mathematicians communicate ideas by ‘logical
attributes’, which ‘represent what lies in our concepts’ (CJ, AA 5:314). For
instance, ultimately, we judge a subsidiary line to be conducive to the proof of
the Law of Sines in terms of its compatibility with the concept of this proof.
The line is evidently a logical attribute which belongs to the conceptual unity.
In this case, the power of judgement disciplines the imagination’s creativity
according to a determinate law, such that the imagination displays free
originality but not free lawfulness.
Given the distinction between aesthetic and logical attributes, how can
a demonstration be beautiful? It is tempting to appeal to Kant’s notion of
adherent or dependent beauty (anhängende Schönheit), namely, beauty that
presupposes an object’s perfection according to its concept (CJ, AA 5:229).
Insofar as a beautiful artwork is ‘a beautiful representation of a thing’ 
(CJ, AA 5:311), its beauty presupposes the concept of the ‘thing’ and is
adherent. By analogy, it seems that a mathematical proof can be adherently
beautiful in constructing a conceptual unity, much in the same way that
a portrait can be beautiful in depicting a certain person.
Nevertheless, as Zangwill points out, an object’s adherent beauty can ‘come
apart’ from the object’s functionality or perfection; by contrast, a dysfunctional
proof cannot be beautiful, such that its appreciation is not genuinely
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aesthetic.28 Indeed, a portrait’s beauty consists not in how perfectly it
represents a person but in the particular way it accomplishes this task, a way by
which the artist beautifully conveys an aesthetic idea, while a completed proof
is evaluated solely in terms of its perfection. Rieger disagrees with Zangwill on
the grounds that ‘some beauty may depend on actual success in fulfilling 
the function’.29 But as I see it, while a work’s adherent beauty does depend on
its perfection, the latter is a necessary but insufficient condition. As Allison
nicely puts it, ‘a judgement of adherent beauty is not purely a judgement of
taste, though the taste component within the complex evaluation itself
remains pure’.30 We would judge an artwork (qua artwork) to be beautiful only if
it is ‘academically correct’ (CJ, AA 5:310), but we never judge its beauty in terms
of its correctness. For Kant, although adherent beauty presupposes conceptual
accordance, ‘perfection does not gain by beauty, nor does beauty gain by
perfection’ (CJ, AA 5:231). By contrast, we would not retain a certain step in
a demonstration unless it is functional and compatible with the latter’s concept.
Hence, the satisfaction entirely consists in the step’s functionality.
Rieger argues that there is more to a proof’s evaluation than its ‘simple
effectiveness’, for otherwise ‘any two correct proofs of the same theorem would
be on a par’.31 Indeed, we may prefer one proof to another even when they
both demonstrate the same theorem, but is this preference aesthetic? For
instance, there exist two proofs for the irrationality of √2: the first makes use of
odd and even numbers, the second prime numbers. Cellucci claims that 
the second proof is ‘beautiful’ because ‘it provides understanding’ by showing
the real reason ‘why √2 cannot be a fraction’.32 But, from a Kantian perspective,
I would contend that we favour the second proof because it serves to
demonstrate the irrationality of square roots of all prime numbers, which gives
the real reason for the irrationality of √2 (that is, a particular case); by contrast,
the first proof applies exclusively to a particular case. In this regard, the second
proof is not more beautiful but more useful or better, as it justifies 
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28 Zangwill, Metaphysics of Beauty, 141–42.
29 Adam Rieger, ‘The Beautiful Art of Mathematics’, Philosophia Mathematica 26 (2018):
242.
30 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste, 290.
31 Rieger, ‘Beautiful Art’, 243.
32 Carlo Cellucci, ‘Mathematical Beauty, Understanding, and Discovery’, Foundation of
Science 20 (2015): 348–49. In the same vein, Davis and Hersh claim that the second
demonstration ‘exhibits a higher degree of aesthetic delight’ because it ‘seems to
reveal the heart of the matter’. Philip J. Davis and Reuben Hersh, The Mathematical
Experience (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), 299. Hardy also regards this as an
example of a ‘beautiful theorem’ (Mathematician’s Apology, 19–20). It is with such
‘beauty’ in view, I believe, that Hardy famously states ‘I am interested in mathematics
only as a creative art’ (ibid., 30). 
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the unification of more particular numbers under a more general concept or
theorem. Similarly, Euclid’s proof of the infinitude of prime numbers, elegant
and simplistic as it is, should be considered an example of perfection rather
than beauty.
Hence, the result or eventual success of a demonstration only brings about
a satisfaction in perfection. Thus far I have shown that, much like in the creation
of artworks, the power of judgement imposes lawfulness on the freely original
imagination in the formulation of proofs. The question remains as to how the
aesthetic power of judgement or taste brings free lawfulness to the imagination
in doing mathematics. The next section will show how a proof can be beautiful
in its process.
III
I propose that the processes of formulating and studying a complex proof
require multiple steps and progressive interactions between the freely original
imagination and taste. My account is consistent with Kant’s aesthetics but not
spelled out by Kant himself. The mental operation in question is again
analogous to that of artistic creation.
I suggest that, for the artist who attempts to convey Jupiter’s powerfulness in
an eagle, he or she would sketch a beautiful outline of the eagle using his or her
taste, on the basis of which his or her freely original imagination further
generates a great multitude of intuitions about the details. As Merleau-Ponty
poetically describes, in painting, Matisse’s brush may ‘meditate […] to try ten
possible movements, dance in front of the canvas, brush it lightly several times,
and crash down finally like a lightning stroke upon the one line necessary’.33 All
the possible intuitions can become a part of the eagle, but not all of them can
fit into a beautiful form and express the aesthetic idea. Once again, it requires
taste to single out the subjectively suitable intuition, say, two curves paired
with a triangle, while no objective principle can explain why the two match
each other. In other words, taste brings free lawfulness to the imagination’s free
originality. Only then does the imagination further generate, supplementary 
to this composition as its details, a multitude of spots and shapes for taste to
judge.
Hence, taste does not indiscriminately check all intuitions produced by 
the imagination. Rather, taste starts by selecting a general outline and
proceeds further and further into the details. The artist does not begin with
a mental image of all possible wing profiles, claw shapes, and so on, which
33 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence’, in Signs, trans.
Richard McCleary (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 45.
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would be overwhelming. Rather, his or her freely original imagination interacts
with taste at different levels and thereby obtains free lawfulness. In the end the
artist may need to revise a choice made by taste at an earlier stage, which was
entirely appropriate then but inconsistent with the details added later. Artists
often modify their drafts.
Analogously, the process of formulating a complex proof requires many
subsidiary steps, which are not produced and judged in one go. When 
the imagination generates a multitude of possibilities for the first step, 
the power of judgement cannot immediately identify the correct move
according to the theorem or theory, for we are still trying to access the latter
and do not yet have insight into all subsequent steps that would lead to it.
Instead, just as in artistic creation, the power of judgement remains aesthetic
and singles out a subsidiary step which appears most suitable for constructing
some as-yet indeterminate concept. Put differently, without knowing whether
and how exactly this step would lead to the theorem or law, we judge by 
the mere feeling of lawfulness without law, by means of which we eventually
approach the law. During this procedure, the imagination freely presents
subsidiary steps and freely conforms to the understanding’s lawfulness in
general. In its originality, the imagination is free from conceptual guidance, and
yet, following the aesthetic guidance, the imagination also displays lawfulness
that is free from conceptual accordance. Therefore, the proof is artistic in its
formulation. We select an initial, seemingly appropriate step with taste, and our
imagination further generates a multitude of possibilities for a subsequent step,
which we evaluate with taste once again, such that the two faculties interact
progressively.34
In the earlier example, the drawing of the subsidiary lines OA, OB, and 
OC does not immediately prove that ∠C is a constant. Instead, the exact
serviceability of these lines remains indeterminate, such that the whole
composition is only judged to be rich in suggestions, or rather, ‘beautiful’.
Further, we avail ourselves of the properties of isosceles triangles (that is, two
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34 Wenzel makes a similar observation: ‘In the process of trying out new things,
a mathematician is like a painter.’ Christian Helmut Wenzel, ‘The Art of Doing
Mathematics’, in Creativity and Philosophy, ed. Berys Gaut and Matthew Kieran
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 325. But Wenzel does not spell out the multiple and
progressive interactions between the imagination and the aesthetic power of
judgement. More importantly, Wenzel identifies the imagination’s freedom in an
aesthetic judgement with ‘trying out new things, new objects and new methods’;
and so, he does not clearly distinguish the imagination’s free originality (in trying out
new things) from its free lawfulness (in the experience of beauty). See his ‘Art and
Imagination in Mathematics’, in Imagination in Kant’s Critical Philosophy, ed. Michael
L. Thompson (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013), 63. 
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angles opposite the legs must be equal) and of triangles in general (that is,
interior angels add to a constant) to complete the demonstration. For another
example, Figure 3 below illustrates the initial step in Hippasus’ proof of 
the irrationality of √2. The very discovery of the unforeseen relation between
the number and the geometrical shapes displays not only free creativity but
also free lawfulness, as it indicates (without specifying) some as-yet
indeterminate conceptual unity and thereby brings about a beautiful feeling.
Based on these two squares, we construct smaller and even smaller squares 
(as shown in Figure 4) until we conclude that there is no ‘common unit of
measure’ for the side length and the diagonal length in any square, that is, their
ratio must be irrational.
Fig. 3 Fig. 4
Conversely to artistic creation, however, the ultimate goal of a mathematical
proof is to construct a conceptual unity of such steps, otherwise we would have
to retreat, revise, and restart. We would discard a step if it did not follow strictly
logically from the assumptions made and the axioms of the mathematical
theory in question. What is eventually proven, in each step, must be true and
useful. Mathematicians are rarely so lucky to succeed in one try. Rather, 
they experiment back and forth, guided by the feeling of beauty, namely, by
the pleasure in the imagination’s free lawfulness.35 Meanwhile, the imagination’s
original creativity (which constitutes genius) can be entirely free from guidance.
Some commentators underscore the role of the imagination’s creativity in
the experience of mathematical beauty. Angela Breitenbach contends that
‘subsidiary steps’ in a demonstration derive neither analytically from concepts
nor empirically from given sensory data. Instead, it is the ‘free play’ of our
35 One might contend that the mathematical experimentation is guided by the
‘indeterminate concept’, while the beautiful feeling is the result of finding the right
move. But in my view, it is exactly through the feeling that we judge an intermediate
move to be ‘right’, that is, corresponding to some indeterminate concept.
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imagination that offers ‘different ways of combining the sensory fold’ and
‘produces sensible unities’. And so, judgements about the beauty of
mathematical proofs are ‘grounded in the creative process of the imagination’.36
While Breitenbach helpfully identifies the connection between mathematical
proofs and aesthetic creativity, her approach does not clearly distinguish
between the free originality and the free lawfulness of the imagination. 
As I have shown, it is one thing that the imagination’s original output remains
‘undetermined by further conceptual rules’, that is, free from certain conceptual
guidance, but it is quite another that there is ‘no further rule that can account
for the harmony’ and that the imagination’s lawfulness is free from certain
conceptual accordance. In the former, there is no concept to explain 
the possibility of the imagination’s lawfulness, even if the lawfulness turns out
to fit a concept. In the latter, there is no concept to explain the imagination’s
lawfulness itself, exactly because it does not correspond to any concept.
Breitenbach states that the satisfaction in beauty arises as a result of ‘an
unexpected agreement between our imaginative play […] and the conceptual
insight gained thereby’.37 But as I see it, the unexpectedness, namely, 
the freedom in the imagination’s original production, does not distinguish
beauty from perfection, for a satisfaction in perfection can be unexpected as
well. Moreover, the so-called ‘conceptual insight’ straightforwardly contradicts
the ‘lawfulness without law’ that is requisite for beauty.
A complete demonstration can certainly bring about satisfaction, especially
when it shows simplicity, hits on the essence of things, and provides more
understanding for extensive applications. Nevertheless, following Kant’s
dichotomy, we should ascribe such a satisfaction to the perfection of things.38
By contrast, a mathematician experiences a beautiful feeling during the process
of formulating a demonstration, that is, in the sensory manifolds that he or
she experiments with and his or her taste judges to be compatible with
some indeterminate concept.39 Moreover, an apprentice, who studies 
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36 Angela Breitenbach, ‘Beauty in Proofs: Kant on Aesthetics in Mathematics’, European
Journal of Philosophy 23 (2015): 966–69. For similar accounts, see Donald W. Crawford,
‘Kant’s Theory of Creative Imagination’, in Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics, ed. Ted Cohen
and Paul Guyer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 166, and Wenzel, ‘Art and
Imagination’, 57, 65. 
37 Breitenbach, ‘Beauty in Proofs’, 968.
38 From a Kantian perspective, I would dismiss Cellucci’s account that a demonstration
can be beautiful in terms of ‘providing understanding’ and showing ‘why’
(‘Mathematical Beauty’, 348–49).
39 It often happens that the process of discovering a proof is complex (with many steps
tried, examined, and rejected), while the actual proof turns out to be simple and
straightforward. As Wenzel observes: ‘the whole process is visible from the inside,
whereas in third-person perspective, from the outside, this is hardly possible’ 
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the demonstration, also feels beauty in following each step shown to him or
her. While his or her imagination is bound to determinate steps and thus not
original, it nevertheless acquires free lawfulness in representing these steps.
The difference is analogous to that between the creation and the appreciation
of a beautiful artwork. Here, too, we see the importance in distinguishing
between the two respects of Kant’s notion of ‘productive imagination’.
Breitenbach’s approach, insufficient in this regard, cannot explain the beautiful
experience of the process of studying a demonstration.
My account of artistic proofs also facilitates a transition from subjective
purposiveness to objective purposiveness in Kant’s third Critique, a transition
Kant himself fails to address. For Kant, we call something ‘purposive’ insofar
as we must assume its foundation to be ‘a will that has arranged it so in
accordance with the representation of a certain rule’ (CJ, AA 5:220). 
The aesthetic power of judgement represents subjective purposiveness
through the mere feeling of pleasure. In judging a beautiful form, our
imagination freely harmonizes with the understanding, which we can only
explain by assuming the form’s accordance with some indeterminate concept.
Subjective (that is, completely non-conceptual) purposiveness must be formal,
for we hereby appeal to the mere form of purposiveness (that is, a purposive
causality), abstracting from determinate concepts of purpose.
By contrast, the logical power of judgement represents objective
purposiveness according to concepts rather than mere feelings. In most cases,
objective purposiveness is also material rather than formal. For instance, when
we find a regular hexagon in the sand in an apparently uninhabited land, we
consider it to be purposive insofar as we can only explain its possibility by
assuming some creation according to the concept of ‘hexagon’ (CJ, AA 5:370). 
Meanwhile, in § 62, Kant declares the ‘intellectual purposiveness’ of 
the useful properties of shapes or numbers in mathematics to be ‘merely
formal (not real), i.e., as purposiveness that is not grounded in a purpose, for
which teleology would be necessary, but only in general’, although it is
‘objective (not, like the aesthetic, subjective)’ (CJ, AA 5:364). A circle’s property
enables us to draw equivalent angles, for which it is objectively purposive.
Nevertheless, insofar as the property also serves to construct infinitely many
types of shapes, we ground its possibility in a concept ‘only in general’, such
that its purposiveness must be formal, that is, not bounded to any particular,
determinate concept.
(‘Beauty, Genius, and Mathematics’, 326). In my view, we may find beauty during 
the ‘examination’ of possible steps, even if they are eventually rejected, and
perfection in the simplicity of the actual proof. 
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On my reading, the ‘objective, formal purposiveness’ in mathematics is
intended to be the mediation between the ‘subjective, formal purposiveness’ in
aesthetics and the ‘objective, material purposiveness’ in teleology. That said,
Kant maintains a dichotomy between subjective and objective purposiveness.
This dichotomy, though necessary and convincing, keeps beauty and perfection
strictly apart and leaves us in an absolute either/or situation.
In my account, an artistic proof displays beauty in its process but perfection
in its completion. And so, in the very same proof we represent both subjective
and objective purposiveness. It follows that we may regard beauty as
indicative of some possible law that awaits exploration. For instance, we may
compose beautiful music much the same way as we construct the isosceles
triangles in the circle example, and the music may lead to a determinate
arithmetic rule much the same way as the triangles lead to the Law of Sines.
Kant suggests we consider music as ‘the beautiful play of sensations
(through hearing)’, and yet to think ‘mathematically’ about ‘the proportion of
the oscillations in music and of the judging of them’ (CJ, AA 5:325). After all,
our mind plays in music with ‘properties of numbers’ (CJ, AA 5:363). Kant also
takes notice of Pythagoras’ discovery ‘of the numerical relation among 
the tones, and of the law by which they alone produce a music’.40 Indeed, 
the search for mathematical proofs is analogous to the creation of beautiful
artworks.
For another instance, Figure 5 below shows the spiral form that we observe
in many conches, flowers, and even typhoons. Hypothetically, this form may
correspond to the Fibonacci Sequence (1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21…). Figure 6
shows how we prove this correspondence by introducing subsidiary squares
that relate the spiral form to the mathematical principle. On the one hand, 
the form, in its own terms, arouses a purely aesthetic satisfaction. On 
the other hand, the eventual numerical, conceptual unity, encompassing
both the form and the subsidiary shapes, brings about an intellectual
satisfaction. And the beautiful construction of many squares, as intermediate
steps in this demonstration, reconciles the gap between the beautiful form
and the conceptual unity.
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40 Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, trans. Gary Hatfield et al.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), AA 8:392. As Giordanetti points
out, while the numerical ratios result in musical harmony, they do not display
some sort of ‘objective formal beauty’ but rather ‘correspond’ to ‘the play of 
the cognitive faculties’. Piero Giordanetti, ‘Objektive Zweckmäßigkeit, objektive und
formale Zweckmäßigkeit, relative Zweckmäßigkeit (§§ 61–63)’, in Immanuel Kant:
Kritik der Urteilskraft, ed. Otfried Höffe (Berlin: Akademie, 2008), 220.
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Fig. 5 Fig. 6
Let me conclude this paper with a metaphor. We are explorers seeking
a mountaintop on a foggy day with limited vision. Even if we know what 
the top should look like, the way to it is shrouded in mystery. Before us are
many paths leading to somewhere unknown, so we have to experiment with
a path that is the most ascendant and suitable for accessing some higher place
only in general. Whenever we encounter a fork, we just deploy the same
strategy and move on. Suppose we arrive at an impasse or find that all further
paths descend, we can always return, revise the route, and retry. The mere
feeling of ascendancy, without any determinate concept of where the path
leads to, guides our exploration; this is the beautiful feeling that guides an
artistic proof. The beauty of a proof is exactly the beauty which mathematicians
feel in constructing and apprentices feels in studying a proof. If we eventually
reach the top, we celebrate our achievement and admire the simplicity and
convenience of a shortcut – much like the satisfaction in the perfection of
a completed proof and its steps. On the other hand, it could happen that,
instead of reaching the top or acquiring a proof, we encounter a set of Penrose
stairs and linger in the mere pleasure of climbing up, much as artists and their
audience linger with a beautiful form without ever ascertaining a concept
thereof.
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